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COIMIENT
TRANSFEREE LIABTY ON THE SALE AND DISPOSITION OF
CORPORATE ASSETS
ALBERT A. DR STEFANIOt
Since the immediate is always of more concern than the prospective, the
problem of future transferee liability in the sale and disposition of corporate
assets has always been shunted into the background by the immediate specter
of double taxation. A practitioner faced with a transaction involving the sale
of corporate assets, gives little if any thought to Section 311 of the Internal
Revenue Code 1 The emphasis is rather on the cases of Commissioner v. Court
Holding Co.2 and United States v. Cumberland Public Service Co.3 Yet, it is
submitted, the two problems are inextricably interrelated and any tax ap-
praisal of a contemplated sale of a corporate business without an evaluation of
the potential transferee liability consequences is incomplete. It is with a view
to considering this comparatively neglected facet of the tax consequences
flowing from the sale of corporate assets that this paper has been prepared.
THE SzxrtrrE
In substance, Section 311 provides a summary and expeditious remedy for
the taxing authorities in situations where the taxpayer has transferred or dis-
posed of his assets, leaving himself unable to pay his federal taxes.4 It is,
therefore, procedural rather than substantive in character. It permits the gov-
ernment to utilize the same method of tax collection against a transferee as
in the case of the transferor, that is, notice by the Commissioner to the trans-
feree and opportunity accorded to the latter either to pay and sue for a refund
or to proceed before the Tax Court, with a right of review by the courts.5 How-
ever, even under the statute the substantive basis of transferee liability is deter-
t Member of the New York Bar.
1. Section 311 of the Internal Revenue Code is the successor to § 260 of the Revenue
Act of 1926 which section enabled the United States for the first time to proceed against
those secondarily liable in the same manner as against those primarily liable. For an ex-
haustive treatment of that first statute, see Latham, Liability of Transferees under the
Revenue Act of 1926, 22 In. L. REV. 233, 397 (1927).
2. 324 U. S. 331 (1945).
3. 338 U. S. 451 (1950).
4. The constitutionality of the statute was upheld in the case of Phillips v. Commis-
sioner, 283 II. S. 589 (1931).
S. INT. RM. CODE 311 (a). "AtrnOD OF CorLmEcnox. The amounts of the following
liabilities shall, except as hereinafter in this section provided, be assessed, collected, and
paid in the same manner and subject to the same provisions and limitations as in the case
of a deficiency in a tax imposed by this chapter (including the provisions in case of de-
linquency in payment after notice and demand, the provisions authorizing distraint and pro-
ceedings in court for collection, and the provisions prohibiting claims and suits for
refunds). .. 
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mined by settled principles of the common law0 and is the same as that which
could have been enforced prior to the statute by appropriate remedy in the
federal courts. 7 Thus the statute provides that it is "The liability, at law or in
equity, of a transferee of property of a taxpayer in respect of the tax (including
interest, additional amounts, and additions to the tax provided by law) imposed
upon the taxpayer by this Chapter"8 which can be so enforced.
The liability of a transferee may, therefore, be either established at law or
in equity-at law, where the transferee, in connection with the transfer of
assets, expressly or impliedly assumes the obligations of the transferor;0 in
equity, under the trust fund doctrine'0 as, for example, where that doctrine
impresses on transferred property in the hands of a transferee who is not a
bona fide purchaser for value without notice, a trust for the benefit of the
creditors of a dissolved corporation." Thus, differing from his liability at
law, the extent of which is determined by contract, the liability of a trans-
feree in equity is limited to the actual value of the transferred assets received.' "
The statute in defining a transferee as including an "heir, legatee, devisee
and distributee,' ' 13 hardly sheds much light on the question as to who may be
6. "That section [Section 280 of the Revenue Act of 1926) imposes no new obliga-
tion upon the transferee of property of a tax-payer, but it permits collection from him,
by a summary procedure, of taxes owed by the transferor, to the extent that the munici-
pal law makes him liable at law or in equity for the transferor's taxes." Hatch v. Morosco
Holding Co., 50 F. 2d 138, 139 (2d Cir. 1931). To the same effect: Harwood v. Eaton,
68 F. 2d 12 (2d Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 292 U. S. 636 (1934); John Robert Brewer, 17
B. T. A. 713, 717 (1929).
7. It should be noted that the statutory proceeding is not exclusive and whenever the
Commissioner deems it expedient he may institute suit against the transferee rather than
send a deficiency notice under the statute. United States v. Fisher, 57 F. Supp. 410 (E. D.
Mich. 1944).
8. INT. REV. CODE § 311 (a) (1).
9. Shepard v. Commissioner, 101 F. 2d 595 (7th Cir. 1939); Continental Baking Co.
v. Helvering, 75 F. 2d 243 (D. C. Cir. 1934) ; Helvering v. Wheeling Mold & Foundry Co.,
71 F. 2d 749 (4th Cir. 1934). But cf. Reid Ice Cream Corp. v. Commissioner, 59 F. 2d
189 (2d Cir. 1932). Of course the Government may proceed against both the promisor
and any other person who may have received the assets as a transferee. Humbert v. Com-
missioner, 24 B. T. A. 828, 829 (1931); Fifty-Three West Seventy Second Street, Inc.,
23 B. T. A. 164, 167 (1931).
10. 1939-1 (Cumx. BULL. (Part 2) 353; Updike v. United States, 8 F. 2d 913 (8th Cir.
1925); United States v. McHattan, 266 Fed. 602 (D. C. Mont. 1920). For a general dis-
cussion of the trust fund doctrine, see 15A FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA ONc THE PRIVATE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS § 7369 (1938).
11. While it is true that the liability of a transferee is secondary and derivative, where
a corporation has dissolved, the Commissioner is not required to proceed against it before
asserting transferee liability. United States v. Garfunkel, 52 F. 2d 727 (S. D. N. Y. 1931);
Updike v. United States, 8 F. 2d 913 (8th Cir. 1925).
12. Scott v. Commissioner, 117 F. 2d 36 (8th Cir. 1941). However, that liability Is
several so that the Commissioner need not join other transferees in a proceeding against
him to enforce that liability. Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U. S. 589 (1931).
13. INT. REV. CODE § 311 (f).
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a transferee. While the Regulations' 4 do expand this definition, the determina-
tion in the last analysis, as to whether an individual, partnership or corpora-
tion can be held as a transferee, depends on the facts in each case.
THE PROBLEM
Our concern in this paper is with the potential transferee liability conse-
quences inherent in the sale and transfer of corporate assets.
Basically there are three methods by which corporate assets may be trans-
ferred.
(1) The corporation may make the sale itself, distributing to its stockhold-
ers the proceeds from such sale.
(2) The stockholders may first liquidate the corporation, obtain the assets
themselves and sell them to the purchaser.
(3) The stockholders may sell their stock to the purchaser who can then
obtain the assets by liquidating the corporation.
While other considerations'0 certainly play an important part in determining
which of these methods are used, it is doubtlessly true that federal tax
consequences are among the most compelling determinants. Thus because of
the double tax which would result from the use of the first method,'- few,
if any, corporate sales are now conducted in that manner. Rather, the second
or third method is utilized. The Internal Revenue Bureau has, of course, con-
sistently argued that despite the method used, the transaction is a sale by the
14. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.311-1 (1945). "The term 'transferee' as used in this
section includes an heir, legatee, devisee, distributee of an estate of a deceased person, the
shareholder of a dissolved corporation, the assignee or donee of an insolvent per-on, the
successor of a corporation, a party to a reorganization as defined in Section 112, and
all other classes of distributees."
15. Lessors' stockholders to which rentals were paid directly by lessees under terms of
leases, were liable as lessors' "transferees" for income taxes on rentals. Commicsioner v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 141 F. 2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944). See also: Jacob et al. v. Com-
missioner, 139 F. 2d 277 (9th Cir. 1943), reversing, 47 B. T. A. 381 (1942); John Hancock
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Helvering, 128 F. 2d 745 (D. C. Cir. 1942), reversing, 42 B. T. A.
809 (1940). While the Commissioner has the burden of proving that the respondent is a
transferee (LnT. REv. CODE 1119 (a); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U. S. 589 (1931))
the even more onerous burden to prove that no tax liability existed on the part of the
transferor, rests on the transferee (Wayne Body Corp., 22 B. T. A. 401, 413 (1931)).
16. For example, franchises or other valuable leaseholds might only be obtainable by
purchasing the stock and maintaining the corporate entity; or the expenss of conveying
title where the corporation involved owns considerable real estate would make the -ale of
assets inexpedient; or the purchaser may not be willing to assume unknown or contingent
liabilities of a corporation and, therefore, would refuse to purchase stock.
17. Assuming of course a gain on the sale, the first tax would be on the gain realized
on the sale by the corporation; and the second tax would be the gain realized on liqui-
dation by the stockholders (assuming that the value of the property distributed is in excess
of the cost basis of the stock). l-N. REV. CODE 117 (a) and (j). Commisi oner v. Court
Holding Co., 324 U. S. 331 (1945).
1950]
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corporation and should be taxed as such.'8 Prior to the Public Cumberland
Service case" 9 the Bureau was very successful in attacking on that ground
transactions involving liquidation of the corporation followed by a sale of the
assets (second method). 20 What the actual effect of the Cumberland Public
Service case will be on that trend must await further decisions. 21 In contrast
to this, at least pre-Cumberland, success with reference to the second method,
the Bureau has uniformly been defeated in its efforts to have the sale imputed
to the corporation where the liquidation follows the sale of stock (third
method) .22
At the outset, it should be noted that while we are for the most part con-
cerned with the potential transferee liability of either the selling stockholders
or the purchaser, in the event the Bureau's contention that the transaction
was in fact a corporate sale is upheld, the transferee liability for corporate
taxes other than those arising out of the transaction in question, must not be
overlooked. 23
As is to be expected, it is in connection with the orthodox transfer (first
method) that the major body of law involving transferee liability is to be
found. Therefore, it is the principles enunciated in those cases which must be
kept in mind whenever the sale of corporate assets by any method is under con-
sideration.
LiABILITY AT LAW
As has already been indicated, the liability of a transferee may be either
18. The position of the Bureau was aptly stated by the Supreme Court in the Court
-Holding case: "A sale by one person cannot be transformed for tax purposes Into a
sale by another by using the latter as. a conduit through which to pass title. To permit
the true nature of a transaction to be disguised by mere formulisms, which exist solely
to alter tax liabilities would seriously impair the effective administration of the tax poli-
cies of Congress." 324 U. S. 331, 334 (1945).
19. See note 3 supra.
20. Meurer Steel Barrel Co. v. Commissioner, 144 F. 2d 282 (3d Cir. 1944), cert. denied,
324 U. S. 860 (1945); Guinness v. United States, 73 F. Supp. 119 (Ct. Cl. 1947), cert.
denied, 334 U. S. 819 (1948); Rose Kaufman, 11 T. C. 483 (1948), aff'd, 175 F. 2d 28 (3d
Cir. 1949). But see Howell Turpentine Co. v. Commissioner, 162 F. 2d 319 (5th Cir.
1947); A Campo Winery & Distilleries, Inc., 7 T. C. 629 (1946).
21. It would appear that taxability or non-taxability will depend on the trial court's
finding of fact. Thus Justice Black stated: "It is for the trial court, upon consideration of
an entire transaction, to determine the factual category in which a particular transaction
belongs. Here as in the Court Holding Co. case we accept the ultimate findings of fact
of the Trial Tribunal." United States v. Cumberland Public Service Co., 338 U. S. 451, 456
'(1950). Compare the comparable treatment given to the equally perplexing problem of
family partnership in Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U. S. 733 (1949).
22. Dallas Downtown Development Co., 12 T. C. 114 (1949); Steubenville Bridge Co.,
11 T. C. 789 (1948); J. T. S. Brown's Sons Co., 10 T. C. 840 (1948). See, however, dis-
senting opinion of Disney, J., in the Dallas Downtown case, supra at 126.
23. Continental Baking Co. v. Helvering, 75 F. 2d 243 (D. C. Cir. 1934); Concrete
Industries Co., 19 B. T. A. 655 (1930). Thus in United States v. Armstrong, 26 F. 2d 227 (8th
Cir. 1928), transferees were held liable for a new tax retroactively levied. I
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at law or in equity. Since liability at law arises from the assumption of the
liabilities of the seller, it is the purchaser who usually is accorded the dubious
distinction of being held as a transferee on this ground. It is with reference
to this potential source of liability that meticulous draftsmanship may well
mean the difference between such transferee's liability or non-liability since
it doubtlessly is not the intention of a prospective purchaser to assume liability
for the tax imposed on the profit to be made by- the seller.
In Shepard v. Commissioner,24 the agreement for the purchase of the assets
provided for the assumption by the purchaser of "all existing liabilities" of the
seller corporation. The purchaser was held liable as a transferee for the cor-
porate tax due on the profit made by the seller corporation on the sale of the
assets. The liability of the purchaser was predicated on a dual basis, its as-
sumption agreement and as the result of the application of equitable princi-
ples. For the present, we are concerned with the former. In this regard the
court succinctly stated: "... . petitioner, by his agreement to assume all of the
Old Company's 'existing liabilities' became bound to pay the income tax which
the consummation of said agreement created."25 On the other hand, in Reid
Ice Cream Corp. v. Cominssioner;O the purchaser was more fortunate. The
agreement provided that the purchaser "assumes and agrees with the com-
pany to discharge all liabilities of the company existing on this date" (the
closing date). The Court of Appeals in reversing the Board of Tax Appeals,
held there was no liability, either by statute or contract. The court said:
"On this sale, the seller made a profit of 68 per cent. It is unreasonable to assume
that it was the intention of the petitioner to assume the liability for the tax imposed
on this profit."27
and further on in the opinion:
"A tax on the profits of a sale such as is involved here is one of extraordinary
liability, and, unless assumed in plain terms, ought not to be imposed upon the trans-
feree of the property."2 8
How much weight can be given to the Reid case is conjectural. The differ-
ence in the language of the agreements in the Reid and Shepard cases would
appear to be more nominal than real. In any event, it Is clear that these
cases set up a caveat which a purchaser's attorney disregards at his client's
peril.
A further indication of the broad construction placed on assumption agree-
ments by the courts can be gleaned from the cases of Helvering v. Wheeling
Mold & Foundry Co., 29 and Continental Baking Co. v. Helvering,20 in which
24. 101 F. 2d 595 (7th Cir. 1939).
25. Id. at 598.
26. 59 F. 2d 189 (2d Cir. 1932).
27. Id. at 190.
28. Id. at 191.
29. 71 F. 2d 749 (4th Cir. 1934).
30. 75 F. 2d 243 (D. C. Cir. 1934).
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the taxes involved were not on the profit on the sale. In the Wheeling Mold &
Foundry Co. case, the vendees undertook "to pay, satisfy and discharge all the
lawful debts of the vendor. . . ." The Board of Tax Appeals held the pur-
chaser not liable as a transferee on the ground a tax was not a debt in the ordi-
nary sense. However, the purchaser's relief was short-lived. The Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit unanimously reversed, and held the purchaser
to be a transferee. The Court quoted with approval the following language
from the case of Tevander v. Ruysdael:3'
"It is apparent from the language used that the parties intended that the pur-
chaser should assume all obligations or liabilities of the business. The parties knew
that the law imposes income taxes. All parties knew that at the time of the sale
the income taxes were liabilities in futuro; that they would become when imposed,
a fixed liability, a thing owing to the government. The purchaser, therefore, by
assuming the debts of the business, included income taxes of the business."18 2
Similarly, in the Continental Baking Co. case, a corporation which purchased
all the assets of another company and assumed "all existing liabilities" of the
transferor was held as a transferee and therefore liable for taxes determined
as due by the Commissioner at a time subsequent to the sale. The court said:
"We are of the opinion that such a liability may be imposed upon a transferee
of the assets of a corporation against whom a tax was levied, providing that under
the contract of purchase the transferee assumed the liability. . . . The mere fact
that a claim of deficiency taxes is unknown at the date of the transfer does not
relieve the transferee from liability." 33
LIABILITY IN EQuiTY
It is with reference to the liability of the transferee in equity that we reach
the kernel of our inquiry.
Where the first method of selling and disposing of the corporate assets is
utilized, there would hardly appear to be any question but that to the extent
of the proceeds received, the stockholders of the seller corporation can be held
as transferees . 4 However, it is in connection with the position of the purchaser
in that transaction that considerable doubt has been expressed. One eminent
authority has unequivocally stated, "it is hard to see a sound basis for trans-
feree liability on Purchaser."35 While at first blush, it might appear to be flying
in the face of reason to hold as a tax-liable transferee the purchaser who bought
and paid value for the assets, it is submitted that on closer analysis the Bureau's
position takes on added weight.
31 299 Fed. 746 (7th Cir. 1924).
32. Helvering v. Wheeling Mould Foundry Co., 71 F. 2d 749, 752 (4th Cir. 1934).
33. 75 F. 2d 243, 244 (D. C. Cir. 1934).
34. Forest Glen Creamery Co. v. Commissioner, 123 F. 2d 522 (7th Cir. 1941); Hum-
bert v. Commissioner, 24 B. T. A. 828 (1931); Fifty Three West Seventy-Second Street,
Inc., 23 B. T. A. 164 (1931); Robert N. Parrett, 15 B. T. A. 1313 (1929).
35. Magill, Sales of Corporate Stock or Assets, 47 COL. L. REV. 707, 718 (1947).
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The Court of Appeals in the Shepard case succinctly stated the Bureau's
position:
"Equally clear and definite must be the holding that one who dispossesses another
company of all its assets, paying the consideration therefor to a third party,
and leaving the propertyless corporation unable to pay its debts, including taxes
which were inchoate at the time, becomes a trustee and liable in such trusteeship
for taxes and other debts in an amount not exceeding the value of the property
taken from the debtor taxpayer."
30
In a similar vein, the Board of Tax Appeals noted in a case involving transferee
liability covering prior years:
"The courts have uniformly held the purchasing corporation liable to creditors
of the selling corporation, to the extent of the value of the property received, the
sale being in fraud of creditors and the purchaser being a party to such fraud
through his knowledge that the result of the transaction must necessarily leave such
creditors with no assets from which to satisfy their claims." 37
The position of those who would deny any liability on the part of a purchaser
who has paid value finds support in the following terse language from the Reid
case:
"A purchaser of property for value has, in his position as a transferee, no liability
to pay his vendor's tax. ...,8
It is submitted that this latter statement gratuitously assumes that which in
each case must be ferreted out from the facts. It certainly would appear that a
strong argument can be made that a purchaser of corporate assets who knows
that the consideration he pays will be distributed to the stockholders is lacking
in the requisite good faith so as to entitle him to be protected against the claims
of creditors of the selling corporation. At any rate, the Bureau has and will ap-
parently continue to take that position whenever expedient and in view of that
fact alone, the possibility of this unexpected liability merits consideration by the
attorney for the purchaser.
While there is a paucity of cases involving transferee liability where either
the second or third method has been utilized, it would seem the principles laid
down in the Shepard and kindred cases would be applicable. Thus, in J. T.
Wurtsbaugh,39 the Lodwick Lumber Company entered into a contract for the
sale of timber. Prior to completion of the contract, it liquidated and trans-
ferred its assets to its shareholders who thereafter completed the sale. The
court, after imputing the sale to the corporation under the Court Holding
doctrine, held one of the shareholders of the lumber company liable as a
transferee for the tax on the gain in the sale. The court stated:
36. 101 F. 2d 595, 599 (7th Cir. 1939).
37. Concrete Industries Co., 19 B. T. A. 655, 659 (1930).
38. 59 F. 2d 189, 191 (2d Cir. 1932).
39. 13 T. C. 1059 (1949).
1950]
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"As a result of receiving assets of Lodwick on dissolution, petitioner stood in the
shoes of the dissolved corporation and was liable as transferee for payment of
Lodwick's incurred tax liability for 1941 to the extent of the value of such assets." 40
While the case for holding the shareholder who sold assets it received from
the corporation is therefore stronger than that for holding the purchaser, still
in view of the broad language employed in the Shepard and Concrete Indus-
tries cases, caution is dictated in either case. Up to this date the amount of
potential transferee liability involved in the sale of corporate assets accom-
plished by a sale of stock followed by liquidation is limited. The court has
found little merit to the Bureau's contention that the transaction is in sub-
stance a sale by the corporation. However, because of a vigorous Tax Court
dissent,41 prognostication is hazardous and it is certainly within the realm
of possibility that the Tax Court may reevaluate its present position.
The basic question-that is, whether the seller of the stock or the purchaser
could be held as a transferee-appears to have been definitively answered in
the recent case of J. T. S. Brown & Son, Co.42 While certain earlier cases4"
seemed to indicate that the seller of the stock could be held as a transferee,
the Brown case definitely decides the contrary. The facts of the Brown case,
insofar as is pertinent here are relatively simple. One Brown sold his stock
to one Favret who shortly thereafter liquidated the corporation and received
all of the assets. The Commissioner attempted to-hold both Brown and Favret
as transferees. While the court disallowed so much of the liability as was
predicated on the Commissioners contention that the sale in substance was
of the assets of the corporation, there were certain other unpaid taxes due
which necessitated a decision as to whether the seller of the stock or the pur-
chaser should be held as a transferee for those unpaid taxes. The Tax Court
decided that the purchaser and not the seller was liable as a transferee, noting:
"For this reason we must decide the issue of transferee liability. It is clear from
the facts as found by us that petitioner Creel Brown, Jr. is not liable as a trans-
feree. He simply sold his shares of stock to a willing buyer and received cash for
them. He received none of the assets of the company in liquidation. Under these
circumstances, he is not liable as a transferee. On the other hand, it is clear to us
that petitioner James R. Fivret is liable as a transferee for whatever deficiencies and
penalties are determined against the company in a recomputation under Rule S0. The
company was completely liquidated and left with no assets and Favret received all
the assets, which had a value considerably in excess of all the liabilities of the com-
pany, including the liability for federal taxes."
44
40. Id. at 1071.
41. Dallas Downtown Development Co., 12 T. C. 114 (1949); see Disney, 3., dissent-
ing at 126.
42. 10 T. C. 840 (1948).
43. George M. Brady, et a!., 22 B. T. A. 596 (1931); Taylor Oil & Gas Co., et al.,
15 B. T. A. 609 (1929). See also Caire v. Commissioner, 101 F. 2d 992 (5th Cir. 1939).
Contra: Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 34 B. T. A. 540 (1936), al'd, 102 F. 2d
397 (6th Cir. 1939).
44. 10 T. C. 840, 852 (1948).
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Thus it would appear that the seller of stock is in a much stronger and the
buyer of stock in a much more vulnerable position than their counterparts in a
case where the disposition of the assets has been accomplished by a liquidation
followed by a sale of the assets. In that case there hardly appears to be any
question but that the seller of the assets would be liable as a transferee 4s while
the transferee liability of the purchaser still remains a moot question. 6
CONCLUSION
The tax practitioner faced with a contemplated transaction involving the
sale or purchase of corporate assets, would do well to consider carefully the
potential transferee liability consequences inherent in the transaction. Cer-
tainly it is only by such an appraisal that all danger signals can be noted
and proper safeguards set up. Further, such an appraisal prevents the possi-
bility of a totally unexpected awakening when transferee liability is asserted
against the client by the Commissioner and gives to the client at the very
inception of the transaction the complete tax picture to which he is entitled.
45. See notes 34, 39 and 40 supra.
46. See notes 35, 36, 37 and 38 supra.
